Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Oligopoly with Foreign Competitors by Yuanzhu Lu
 
 
Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Oligopoly 
with Foreign Competitors 
Yuanzhu Lu
∗† 




Endogenous order of moves in quantity choice is analyzed in a mixed oligopoly with one 
public  firm,  n ( 1 ≥ )  domestic  private  firms  and  m ( 1 ≥ )  foreign  private  firms.  We 
consider the observable delay game of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) in the context of a 
quantity setting mixed oligopoly where firms first choose the timing of choosing their 
quantities before quantity choice and find subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE). The 
main results are that the public firm chooses to be a follower of all domestic private firms 
and not to be a leader of all foreign private firms, and that the number of SPNE depends 
on the number of domestic private firms and that of foreign private firms. 
 
Keywords: Mixed Oligopoly; Endogenous Timing; Foreign Competitors; Public Firm; 
Private Firm, Simultaneous, Sequential 
 







                                                        
∗ Correspondence: Yuanzhu Lu, Department of Economics, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, National University of 
Singapore, AS2 Level6, 1 Arts Link, Singapore, 117570. Tel: 65-93385758. Email: yuanzhulu@nus.edu.sg. 
† I am grateful to John Wooders for his valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper. All errors are mine.   1 
Studies of mixed markets, in which welfare-maximizing public firms compete against 
profit-maximizing private firms, have become increasingly popular in recent years.
1  In 
the  literature  there  have  been  some  papers  discussing  endogenous timing  in  a  mixed 
oligopoly since alternate order of moves often produces significantly different results and 
thus leads to different welfare level. For example, Pal (1998) analyzed endogenous order 
of moves in a mixed oligopoly where the firms first choose the timing of choosing their 
quantities.
2  Matsumura  (2003)  considered  endogenous  roles  of  firms  in  Stackelberg 
mixed  duopoly  models  where  a  state-owned  public  firm  and  a  foreign  private  firm 
compete. 
However, there is no paper discussing endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly with 
both domestic and foreign private firms. There are no foreign private firms in Pal (1998) 
and no domestic private firms in Matsumura (2003). In reality, public firms, domestic 
private firms and foreign private firms coexist in many industries and in many countries. 
So the endogenous timing in such a mixed oligopoly is very important and it is surprising 
that there is no paper discussing such a question. The purpose of this paper is to fill in 
this gap and to address the issue of endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly with public 
firm,  domestic  and  foreign  private  firms.  We  consider  the  observable  delay  game  of 
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) in the context of a quantity setting mixed oligopoly where 
firms first choose the timing of choosing their quantities before quantity choice and find 
that in any equilibrium, the public firm chooses to be a follower of all the domestic 
                                                        
1  See De Fraja and Delbono (1990) and Nett (1993) for general reviews of the mixed oligopoly model. For recent 
literature  on  mixed  oligopoly  (duopoly),  see  Fjell  and  Heywood  (2002),  Matsushima  and  Matsumura  (2003a), 
Matsushima and Matsumura (2003b), Fjell and Heywood (2004), etc. 
2  Jacques (2004) slightly corrects Proposition 4.1 of Pal (1998).   2 
private firms and not to be a leader of all the foreign private firms, and that the number of 
subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) depends on the number of  domestic private 
firms and that of foreign private firms. 
 
2. The model 
Consider a mixed oligopoly model with one public firm, n ( 1 ≥ ) domestic private 
firms and m ( 1 ≥ ) foreign private firms, all producing a single homogenous product. 
Let 0 q ,
d
i q and 
f
j q   be the quantities of the public firm, of domestic private firm  i  and of 






Q q q q
= =
= + + ∑ ∑ denote  the  aggregate 
quantity.  The  market  price  is  determined  by  the  inverse  demand  function Q a p − = . 
Assume that a is sufficiently large. All domestic and foreign private firms have constant 
and identical marginal costs of production, which are normalized to 0. The public firm 
also has constant marginal cost of production. However, it is assumed to be less efficient 
than the private firms.
3,4  Let  0 > c   be the marginal cost of the public firm. For the sake 
of simplification, fixed costs are assumed to be zero for all firms.   
We  consider  the  observable  delay  game  of  Hamilton  and  Slutsky  (1990)  in  the 
context of a quantity setting mixed oligopoly where the firms first choose the timing of 
choosing their quantities. There are  3 T ≥   possible periods for quantity choice and each 
firm may choose its quantity in only one of those T periods. We consider a two stage 
game. In stage one, the firms simultaneously announce in which period they will choose 
                                                        
3  This assumption also allows us to avoid a trivial solution. If the public firm is more or equally efficient than the 
private firms, it would produce a quantity such that the market price equals its marginal cost, resulting in a public 
monopoly. 
4  We don’t consider the efficiency differential between the domestic private firms and the foreign private firms for the 
sake of simplification. See “conclusion remarks” section for discussion.   3 
their quantities and are committed to this choice. In stage two, after the announcement, 
firms then select their quantities knowing when the other firms will make their quantity 
choices.   
The public firm’s objective is to maximize domestic social surplus defined as the 
sum of consumer surplus and profits of domestic firms (including itself and all domestic 
private firms), whereas each private firm’s objective is to maximize its own profit. Thus, 
the objective functions of the public firm, of domestic private firm  i  and of foreign 
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respectively. 
Our objective is to solve the SPNE of this extended quantity setting mixed oligopoly 
game. We restrict our attention to symmetric equilibria in which all firms of the same 
type choose to produce in the same period.
5 
 
3. Results for three periods ( 3 T = ) 
First, we derive the results for three periods ( 3 T = ). The results for more than three 
periods are presented in Section 4. 
 
Lemma 3.1. The public firm and all domestic private firms producing simultaneously in 
                                                        
5  Though we restrict our attention to symmetric equilibria, we are sure that there is no asymmetric equilibrium because 
no domestic (foreign) private firm wants to be a follower of the other domestic (foreign) private firms if there are at 
least two domestic (foreign) private firms.   4 
the same period cannot be sustained as a SPNE outcome. 
Proof. We can show that either the public firm or a domestic private firm has incentive to 
deviate if the public firm and all domestic private firms produce simultaneously in the 
same period.   
If the public firm and all domestic private firms produce simultaneously as leaders 
and  all  foreign  private  firms  produce  simultaneously  as  followers,  then 
* 2
0 ( 1)( 1) /(2 1) q a n m c m = − + + + , 
* 2 ( 1) /(2 1) d q m c m = + + , 
* ( 1) /(2 1) f q m c m = + + , 
* ( 1) /(2 1) Q a m c m = − + +   and 
* ( 1) /(2 1) p m c m = + + .  If  the  public  firm  deviates  to 
produce  simultaneously  with  all  foreign  private  firms  instead,  then 0
*
0 = q ,  the  total 
equilibrium  output  of  the  domestic  private  firms  is c a − , 
* /( 1) f q c m = + , 
* /( 1) Q a c m = − +   and 
* /( 1) p c m = + . The total output is larger, the equilibrium price is 
smaller, the output of a foreign private firm is smaller, and more output is now being 
produced by more efficient domestic private firms. So the public firm has incentive to 
deviate. 
Similarly,  if  all  foreign  private  firms  produce  simultaneously  as  leaders  and  the 
public  firm  and  all  domestic  private  firms  produce  simultaneously  as  followers,  a 
domestic private firm can increase its profit by producing with all foreign private firms 
simultaneously.   
We can also show that either the public firm or a domestic private firm has incentive 
to deviate if all the firms produce simultaneously in the same period. ■ 
 
Comparing  this  lemma  with  Proposition  3.1  in  Pal  (1998),  we  find  that,  in  the 
presence of foreign private firms in the market, the public firm and all domestic private   5 
firms choosing quantities simultaneously cannot be sustained as a SPNE outcome either.   
 
Lemma 3.2. The public firm acting as a leader of all domestic private firms cannot be 
sustained as a SPNE outcome. 
Proof. We can show that either the public firm, or a domestic private firm, or a foreign 
private firm has incentive to deviate from the cases in which the public firm acts as a 
leader of all domestic private firms. Here, we give an example. If the public firm acts as a 
leader in period 1 and all domestic and foreign private firms produce simultaneously as 
followers in period 2, then 
* 2
0 ( 1) /(2 1) q a n m c m = − + + + , 
* * ( 1) /(2 1) d f q q n m c m = = + + + ,   
* ( 1) /(2 1) Q a n m c m = − + + +   and 
* ( 1) /(2 1) p n m c m = + + + . If the public firm produces in 
period 3 instead, then 0
*
0 = q , the total equilibrium output of the domestic private firms 
is c a − , 
* /( 1) f q c m = + , 
* /( 1) Q a c m = − +   and 
* /( 1) p c m = + .  We  can  easily  check 
that the public firm has incentive to deviate. ■ 
 
Proposition 3.1. In any SPNE, the public firm acts as a follower of all domestic private 
firms. 
Proof. This follows from Lemma 3.1 and 3.2. ■ 
 
Intuitively, a domestic private firm has incentive to produce as a leader of the public 
firm because a domestic private firm can produce a large amount of output so that the 
public  firm  does  not  produce  at  all.  Since  the  domestic  private  firms  produce  more 
efficiently than the public firm, the public firm wants to make the domestic private firms 
produce more by acting as a follower.   6 
Note that the result is independent of the number of domestic private firms, which is 
different from Proposition 3.4 in Pal (1998). In Pal (1998), there is a second SPNE in 
which the public firm produces in period 1 and the domestic private firms produce in 
period 2 if there are two periods to be chosen. Even if there are more than two periods to 
be chosen, Jacques (2004) demonstrated that the public firm producing in period 1 and 
the domestic private firm producing in the last period can be sustained as SPNE when 
there is only one domestic private firm. Why does the different result arise? It is because 
of the presence of foreign private firms. If the public firm chooses to be the leader of 
domestic private firms, foreign private firms will also choose to be leaders of them. 
 
Claim. The public firm chooses to produce in period 2 only when the number of foreign 
private firms is at least two ( 2 m ≥ ) and in this case all domestic and foreign private 
firms choose to produce in period 1. 
Proof. With such an order of moves, we can easily show that a foreign private firm has 
incentive to deviate to produce in period 3 if 1 m = . And we can show that the public firm 
producing  in  period  2  cannot  be  sustained  as  a  SPNE  outcome  except  in  the  case 
stipulated in the claim. ■ 
 
Proposition 3.2. The public firm acting as a leader of all foreign private firms cannot be 
sustained as a SPNE outcome. That is, in any SPNE, the public firm produces with all 
foreign private firms simultaneously or as a follower of them. 
Proof. This follows from Proposition 3.1 and Claim. ■ 
   7 
The result that the public firm chooses to produce with all foreign private firms 
simultaneously or as a follower of them in any SPNE is sharply different from the result 
in Matsumura (2003) that the public firm becomes the leader in the endogenous role 
game.
6  So we can see that the presence of domestic private firms has a great impact on 
the role of the public firm. 
 
Proposition 3.3. The number of SPNE depends on the number of domestic private firms 
and that of foreign private firms. Specifically, 
(1) There are 6 SPNE when  1 n = and 1 m = , that is, when there are only one domestic 
private firm and one foreign private firm in the market. In equilibrium, the public firm 
chooses to produce in period 3, the domestic private firm chooses to produce in 
period 1 or 2, and the foreign private firm chooses to produce in period 1, 2 or 3. 
(2) There are 3 SPNE when  1 n =   and 2 m ≥ , that is, when there are only one domestic 
private firm and at least two foreign private firms in the market. In any equilibrium, 
all  foreign  private  firms  produce  in  period  1.  The  domestic  private  firm  and  the 
public  firm  produce  in  period  1  and  2,  or  period  1  and  3,  or  period  2  and  3, 
respectively. 
(3) There  are  3  SPNE  when  2 n ≥   and 1 m = ,  that  is,  when  there  are  at  least  two 
domestic private firms and only one foreign private firm in the market. All domestic 
private firms produce in period 1, the public firm produces in period 3, and the 
foreign private firm produces in period 1, 2 or 3. 
                                                        
6  Here we want to point out that proposition 3 in Matsumura (2003) might be incorrect. Besides the equilibrium 
identified by proposition 3, there is another possible equilibrium in which the foreign private firm acts as a leader while 
the public firm acts as a follower. If we use the same framework as we use in this paper, we can find this equilibrium. 
However, this equilibrium is dominated by the one identified by proposition 3 in Matsumura (2003).     8 
(4) There  are  2  SPNE  when  2 n ≥   and 2 m ≥ ,  that  is,  when  there  are  at  least  two 
domestic  private  firms  and  at  least  two  foreign  private  firms  in  the  market.  All 
domestic and foreign private firms produce in period 1, and the public firm produces 
in period 2 or 3. 
 
Proof. We prove this proposition by checking that no firm has incentive to deviate in 
each SPNE of each case. 
(1) When  1 n = and 1 m = : Firstly, note that the public firm chooses to produce in period 
3 when 1 m =   (which follows from Claim). Secondly, the domestic private firm has 
no incentive to deviate since it is a leader of the public firm and cannot increase its 
output  because  there  is  only  one  domestic  private  firm.  Thirdly,  the  first  order 
condition  of  the  public  firm’s  domestic  social  welfare  maximization  problem  is 
0 ) ( 1 0
0
= − + − =
∂
∂
c q q a
q
SS d , that is, 
f q c p 1 − = . If the foreign private firm produces in 





f = . Meanwhile, when the 
foreign  private  firm  produces  in  period  3,  the  first  order  condition  of  its  profit 
maximizing problem is  0 2 ) ( 1 1 0
1
= − + − =
∂
∂ f d
f q q q a
q
SS
  and its profit-maximizing output 
is the same. Hence, the foreign private firm does not care about in which period to 
produce.   
(2) When  1 n =   and 2 m ≥ : Firstly, the public firm has no incentive to deviate. Secondly, 
the domestic private firm has no incentive to deviate for the same reason as in the first 
case. Thirdly, the first order condition of the public firm’s domestic social welfare   9 
maximization problem is 0 ) ( 1 0
0
= − + − =
∂
∂
c q q a
q








= −∑ . No foreign 
private firm has incentive to deviate because its output decreases if it deviates. 
(3) When  2 n ≥   and 1 m = : Firstly, the public firm has no incentive to deviate. Secondly, 
all domestic private firms have no incentive to deviate since they want to produce 
more in period 1 and cannot increase its output by deviating. Thirdly, the only foreign 
private firm has no incentive to deviate for the same reason as in the first case. 
(4) When  2 n ≥   and 2 m ≥ : Firstly, the public firm has no incentive to deviate. Secondly, 
all domestic and foreign private firms have no incentive to deviate since they want to 
produce more in period 1 and cannot increase its output by deviating. ■ 
 
4. Main Results for more than three periods ( 3 T > ) 
Proposition 4.1. If  3 T > , there are the following SPNE: 
(1)  When  1 n =   and 1 m = ,  the  public  firm  produces  in  the  last  period,  the  domestic 
private firm produces in any period except the last period, and the foreign private 
firm produces in any period; 
(2)  When  1 n =   and 2 m ≥ , all foreign private firms produce in period 1, the domestic 
private  firm  produces  in  any  period  except  the  last  period,  and  the  public  firm 
produces in any subsequent period after the period in which the domestic private 
firm produces; 
(3)  When  2 n ≥   and 1 m = ,  all  domestic  private  firms  produce  in  period  1  and  the 
public firm produces in the last period, and the foreign private firm produces in any 
period;   10 
(4)  When  2 n ≥   and 2 m ≥ , all domestic and foreign private firms produce in period 1, 
and the public firm produces in any subsequent period. 
Proof.  We  need  to  note  that  a  foreign  private  firm  has  incentive  to  deviate  to  be  a 
follower of the public firm if 1 m = . So the public firm must produce in the last period 
when 1 m = . We also need to note that a domestic (foreign) private firm has incentive to 
produce in period 1 if there are at least two domestic (foreign) private firms. Therefore, 
all domestic (foreign) private firms must produce in period 1 if  2 n ≥ ( 2 m ≥ ). ■ 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In  this  paper,  we  investigate  endogenous  timing  in  a  mixed  oligopoly  with  one 
public  firm,  n ( 1 ≥ )  domestic  private  firms  and  m ( 1 ≥ )  foreign  private  firms  by 
considering the observable delay game of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) in the context of a 
quantity setting mixed oligopoly where firms first choose the timing of choosing their 
quantities  before  quantity  choice.  We  find  that  in  any  equilibrium,  the  public  firm 
chooses to be a follower of the domestic private firm and not to be a leader of all foreign 
private firms, and that the number of SPNE depends on the number of domestic private 
firms and that of foreign private firms. 
The results in this paper question the exogenous timing in the research of a mixed 
oligopoly with both domestic and foreign private firms. If the firms could choose the 
timing of their quantity choices, the timing should be endogenous. The contribution of 
this  paper  is  to  extend  Pal  (1998)  by  introducing  foreign  private  firms  into  a  mixed 
oligopoly. Also a mixed oligopoly consisting of public firm, domestic and foreign private 
firms is more realistic. 
One  extension  of  this  paper  is  to  consider  the  efficiency  differential  between   11 
domestic  private  firms  and  foreign  private  firms.  Generally,  foreign  ones  are  more 
efficient. So we can assume foreign private firms’ marginal costs are zero, while domestic 
ones’  marginal  costs  are  positive  but  less  than  public  firms’.  Most  of  the  results  are 
expected to hold in this extension provided that demand is sufficiently high. The public 
firm has incentive to be a follower of domestic private firms and has little incentive to be 
a leader of foreign private firms. Actually, we have considered such a setting when there 
are only one public firm, one domestic private firm and one foreign private firm and 
found that all the results hold true when demand is sufficiently high and the foreign 
private firms’ cost advantage over the domestic ones is not very big. 
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